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/
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RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by Respondent, who was the
Plaintiff in the Lower Court, against the Appellants, who are
Co-Trustees and beneficiaries of the residuary estate, wherein
the Respondent seeks to compel the distribution of the estate
in accordance with the terms of an inter vivos trust agreement.
The Counterclaim of the Co-Trustees, who are also beneficiaries
under the terms of the inter vivos trust agreement, seek to
exclude the Respondent from participating in the distribution

of the residuary estate of the deceased Settlor, and to limit
the distribution to the Respondent of only the specific bequest
set forth in the inter vivos trust agreement and seeking a
reformation of paragraph F of Article III of the Trust Agreement
so as to prevent Respondent from participating in a one-fourth
equal distribution of the residual trust estate in accordance
with the provisions set forth in said paragraph.

The basis

set forth for the reformation of the Trust Agreement is alleged
to be a scrivener's error on the part of the attorney who drafted
the trust instrument.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Lower Court granted Judgment in favor of Respondent
and against Appellants, holding that an inter vivos trust cannot
be altered after the death of Settlor by a claim of scrivener's
error, where the dispositive terms of the trust are sought
to be altered without proof of fraud or undue influence.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks upholding of the Judgment of the Lower
Court and the denial of any right of reform of the trust instrument
and that the terms of the trust instrument be carried forth
in the manner clearly and unequivocally set forth therein.
-2-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The testimony set forth in the Lower Court revealed
that the Decedent, Delia Zillah C. Rentmeister, (R-39), who
will hereinafter be referred to herein as the Settlor, employed
the services of Attorney William J. Critchlow, III, who will
hereinafter be referred to herein as Settlor's Attorney, for
the purposes of estate planning and that the Settlor's Attorney
did draft an inter vivos trust in September, 1968, (R-39),
and that the Settlor had four children, namely James Howard
Rentmeister, Donald Neil Rentmeister, June R. DeSilva, who
are also the Defendants and Appellants in the instant matter
before this Court, and Ned Everest Rentmeister, who was deceased
at the time of the making of the inter vivos trust and is and
was survived at all times herein by the Respondent, Larry B.
Rentmeister, who was also the grandson of the Settlor and the
only child surviving of the Decedent, Ned Everest Rentmeister.
(R-39)
A Family Trust Agreement was drafted on October 3, 1968,
and subscribed to by the Settlor and by the three Trustees,
June R. DeSilva, James Howard Rentmeister, and Donald Neil
Rentmeister, the Appellants herein (R-53).
The Settlor reserved to herself the right to amend or
revoke the Trust or to change the beneficiaries thereof, or
-3-

to withdraw the whole or any part of the trust estate by filing
a notice of revocation, modification/ change, or withdrawal
with the Trustees (R-48).
The Trust Agreement further provided under Article III,
paragraph E, as follows:
After the payment of debts and expenses and the
withdrawal of all personal affects as hereinabove
provided, Larry B. Rentmeister shall have the right
to withdraw from the trust estate the sum of $5,000.00.
In the event that he shall fail to make such withdrawal,
or should die before making such withdrawal, said
sum shall be distributed by Trustees to his surviving
descendants and dependents for the purpose of providing
such descendants and dependents with care, support,
maintenance, medical care, and education. (R-50)
Under the same Article III in paragraph F thereof, the
Trust Agreement further provided as follows:
After the payment of debts and expenses and the
withdrawals as hereinabove provided, Trustees
shall divide the balance of the trust estate into
equal shares, one for each of Grantorfs children
then living, and one for each of Grantor's children
then deceased, leaving living descendants. (R50)
Under Article III, paragraph F, subparagraph 4a, the
Trust Agreement provided as follows:
Upon the death of a child of Grantor or lawful
descendant of a deceased child of Grantor for
whom a trust is then held, such trust, to the
extent not appointed as hereinabove provided,
shall be apportioned in partial shares among his
or her living lawful descendants upon the principle of representation, which partial shares
shall be held, administered, and distributed as
separate trusts ***. (R-51)

-4-

On November 8, 1971, an amendment to the Family Trust
Agreement was made by the Settlor, wherein the Trust Agreement
of October 3, 1968, was amended only as to paragraph E of
Article III, and substituted therein was the following:
E. LARRY B. RENTMEISTER. After the payment of
debts and expenses and withdrawal of all personal
affects as hereinabove provided, Larry B. Rentmeister
shall have the right to withdraw from the trust
estate the sum of $7f000.00. In the event he
shall fail to make such withdrawal, or should
he die before making such withdrawal, said sum
shall be distributed by Trustees to his surviving
descendants and dependents for the purpose of
providing such descendants and dependents with
care, support, maintenance, medical care, and
education*
The foregoing Amendment was subscribed to by the Settlor
on November 8, 1971, and also by the three Appellants, who
were also the Trustees of the Estate. (R-55)

No other amendment

or change of the original Agreement has been presented in evidence
before the Court.
At time of trial in the Lower Court, the only witness
brought forth was Settlorfs Counsel, and prior to any material
testimony being given by said witness, Counsel for the Respondent
made objection to any testimony of the witness. (R-79)

Counsel

for Respondent asked for an acknowledgement by the Court and
Counsel for Appellants, that there be a continuing objection
to any testimony by Settlor's Attorney, which was stated by
-5-

the Court and agreed to by Counsel for the Appellant. (R-80)
Counsel for the Appellants further stipulated:
Rather than disrupt the proceedings/ your Honor,
we would agree that he (Counsel for Respondent)
objects to any testimony from Mr. Critchlow, and
let it go at that. I don't think there is a problem
on that. I will tell the Supreme Court that.
<
(R-80)
A reiteration of such objection was again made by Counsel
for the Respondent and acknowledged by Counsel for Appellants.
(R-81)
The Settlor's Attorney testified, that he personally
dictated the original Trust Agreement and the subsequent Amendment
to the Trust Agreement. (R-88)
The Settlor became demised on November 2, 1913,

at the

age of 78 (R-88), leaving an estate in the amount of $113,629.87
(R-89).
The Settlor's Attorney further testified that he had
been advised by the Settlor, that her son, Ned, was killed
in 1944, and that the Settlor was the beneficiary of her son's
G.I. insurance in the sum of $10,000.00. (R-92)

The Respondent

herein being the only living child of the Settlor's deceased
son, Ned, and a grandson of the Settlor (R-92,R-46).
The Settlor's Attorney further testified that it was
not uncommon in his practice of drafting testamentary instruments
-6-

for a parent to leave to a deceased child's children the share
the deceased child would have received (R-94).
Further testimony of Settlor's Counsel was to the affect,
that at the time of the signing of the original Trust Agreement
on October 3, 1968, (R-54), the Settlor and the three Appellants
were present in the offices of Counsel for the Settlor (R95), and that the Settlor read the Trust Agreement, that Settlor's
Counsel presumed that the three Trustees, the Appellants herein,
also read the Trust Agreement (R-96) and that the Counsel for
the Settlor did not read the Trust Agreement (R-96).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
INTER VIVOS TRUST CANNOT BE REFORMED ON ALLEGATION
OF SCRIVENER'S ERROR WHEN ITS CONTENT AND INTENT
ARE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL.
The Complaint of the Respondent, who was the Plaintiff
in the Lower Court, brought an action against the Trustees
of the trust estate of the Settlor, to compel the Trustees
to make distribution of the one-fourth equal share in the remainder
of the estate in accordance with the provisions of the Family
Trust Agreement following the demise of the Settlor, which
occurred on November 2, 1973. (R-14,R-33)
The defense of the Appellants, who were the Defendants

-7-

in the Lower Court/ sets forth that through inadvertence and
mistake of the Settlor's Attorney in the preparation of the
Trust Agreement/ that the appropriate exclusionary language
excluding the Respondent from participating in the residue of
said estate was not included in the distribution paragraph F
of the Trust Agreement (R-16/R-45)/ and requested that the
Court should reform the Trust Agreement to comply with the
Settlor's intent as alleged by the testimony of Settlor's Attorney.
The Court in its Memorandum Decision gave Judgment to
the Respondent and against the Appellants/ holding that the
Trustor executed the trust as an inter vivos act on October 3/
1968/ and made an Amendment thereon on November 8/ 1971, and
the Settlor being now deceased, the first effort to reform
the instrument occurred April 10/ 1974/ by means of the Answer
and Counterclaim filed by the Appellants, in response to the
Complaint seeking enforcement of the trust by the Respondent.
CR-59)
The Court found that the Co-Trustees are children of
the deceased/ Settlor/ and that the Respondent is the only
child of the deceased child of the Settlor, and stated that
the issue presented to the Court was whether the dispositive
provisions on the death of an inter vivos Settlor can be reformed
after death of the Settlor upon the claim of a scrivener's
-8-

error, and held that the rules to be applied in a determination
of the reformation of an inter vivos trust, such as that before
the Lower Court, are the rules which must be applied pertaining
to Wills. (R-59)
The Appellants cited on page 8 of their Brief, the case
of In Re Harmon's Trust, 164 N.Y.S.2d 468, wherein the Supreme
Court of New York held:
If in fact there was a scrivener's error in transcribing Settlor's intention at the time of creating
the Trust, it is correctible by the Court in an
action to reform the instrument ** in all the
cases where reformation was granted by the Court,
Petitioner presented direct and convincing evidence
.of the necessary fact of Settlor's original intentions
and instructions and of the mistake in the instrument as drawn.
This cited case involved an irrevocable trust, which
empowered the Trustee, who was the Settlor's only son, to make
only such investments as were permitted by the laws of the
State of New York for the investment of trust funds. Approximately
six months later, the then still living Settlor executed a
second document amending the first document and permitting
the Trustee to invest and re-invest the proceeds which he deemed
in his discretion to be in the best interest of the Trust.
The Amended Trust Agreement was executed by the Settlor and
by all of the adults involved in the first trust, but there
were then in being six grandchildren of Settlor who, because
-9-

of infancy, were incapable of giving consent.

The grandchildren,

who had a contingent interest as remaindermen in the trust,
and having a vested interest in accordance with the Statutes
of the State of New York, and not having executed the document,
had a right to subsequently object to the altering of the irrevocable
trust by the drafting of a second trust, which had changed
the conditions and terms of investment by the Trustee.

Following

the demise of the Trustee, it was determined that there had
been losses occasioned by the unauthorized transactions as
were allowed by the second Trust Agreement, and a Petition
was filed by the Executors of the deceased Trustee alleging
scrivener's error in the first Trust Agreement and seeking
to reform the original indenture to state and conform to the
second Trust Agreement.
The Court actually held, that inasmuch as both the Trustee
and Settlor were demised and there was no direct evidence brought
out of the intent of the Settlor, and a reformation was attempted
to be made by relying on circumstantial evidence, the Court
held:
Whatever the real facts, it is clear that both
Settlor and her son were educated persons and
must have read and understood this lengthy and
express limitation clause deliberately inserted
in the indenture, particularly in the case of
a son who as the "scrivener" would necessarily
have been conscious of the very words he was using
-10-

to express that intention. This is not a situation
of a mere omission, concerning which there may
be doubt as to whether through inadvertence instructions have not been followed, but of a clearly
expressed and complete clause.***

"

The Court denied the Petition for revision based upon alleged
scrivener's error.
The facts in the instant matter before the Court are
to the effect, that the Counsel for the Settlor is a competent
attorney who is skilled in the drafting of testamentary and
trust instruments and that the clear and unequivocal words
as set forth by him, which he has alleged as having personally
dictated (R-88), with the testimony by Settlor's Counsel, that
he presumes that the client read the Trust Agreement prior
to subscribing thereto (R-96), and further presumed that the
three Trustees also read the trust instrument prior to signing,
and the very nature of the dispositive part of the Trust Agreement
as set forth in Article III, Paragraph F, does not subject
itself to an error of omission, but only possibly of co-mission,
which reads partially as follows:
**Trustees shall divide the balance of the trust
estate into equal shares, one for each of Grantor's
children then living, and one for each of Grantor's
children then deceased leaving living descendants
***

.

This provision is of such clarity as cannot have been
read without its clear and unequivocal meaning being understood
-11-

even by a layman. (R-50)
In spite of the clear-cut language of this dispositive
provision above, the testimony of the scrivener stated as follows:
I apparently left out an exclusion for the deceased
children, the son of Mrs* Rentmeister; either
I dictated it and my secretary left it out in
the transcription, or I failed to dictate it.
(R-88)
Counsel for Settlor, who was the scrivener, further
testified that while the paragraph was clear, that it talks
about a deceased child, and "that it could mean a deceased child
subsequent to the execution of this document11. (R-97)
The attention of the Court is then called to paragraph
4a of the original Trust Agreement, wherein it provides as follows:
DISTRIBUTION TO DESCENDANTS. On the death of
a child of Grantor or lawful descendant of the
deceased child of Grantor for whom a trust is
then held, such trust, to the extent not appointed
as hereinabove provided, shall be apportioned
in partial shares among his or her living lawful
descendants upon the principle of representation,
***. (R-51)
If it was the belief and intent, that paragraph F applied
only to the deceased children of living beneficiaries, then
it would appear that paragraph 4a, which provided for distribution
to the descendants, is purely redundant.
The Appellant has cited Paulson v. Kunz, 253 P.2d 621,
as authority for the reformation of the Trust Agreement before
-12-

this Court, which Respondent submits to the Court, this case
is substantially less than on all fours with the instant matter
before the Court, in that the Paulson case was the reformation
of a contract with all of the parties living and able to present
their own testimony and not as in the instant matter, wherein
the Settlor is demised and the scrivener is attempting to change
the entire dispositive provisions of a Trust Agreement by what
he orally states is the intent of the Settlor.
Even in the Paulson case, this Court stated:
Without discussing the propriety of or authority
for such procedure, it is difficult to perceive
.how one can arrive at the conclusion, that three
is clear and convincing evidence for the extra
ordinary relief by way of reformation, considering
the law's policy to lend dignity to written instruments and sanctity to the Parol Evidence Rule.
The fact that one is ignorant of the contents
of the paper he signs necessarily does not relieve
him from contractual liability and should not
do so here.
The Court in the Paulson case did not allow the reformation of the contract and the similarity between the Paulson
case and the instant matter is that the scrivener alleged,
that after dictating the trust, that he did not bother to read
it (R-96).

A more unexplainable part of the contention of

the Appellants is the fact, that upon the amendment of the
original Trust Agreementf which occurred more than three years
-13-

subsequent to the making of the first Trust Agreement, that
the scrivener did not again read the instrument prior to making
an amendment and revision of the original Trust Agreement/
when the specific bequest to the Respondent was changed from
$5/000.00 in the first Trust Agreement to $7/000.00 in the
Amended Trust Agreement. (R-55)

It is testified to that as

a matter of fact/ the scrivener did not know of the error allegedly
made in the two instruments of trust until Counsel for Respondent
made demand for distribution in accordance with the terms of
the Trust of one-fourth of the estate, which demand occurred
in 1974. (R-89)
The Appellants cite the case of Webb v. Webb/ 209 P.2d
201/ on page 5 of Appellants1 Brief, in support of the right
of revision of an inter vivos trust following the demise of
the Settlor, when as a matter of fact the question decided
by the Court was whether or not a deed in form absolute was
intended as a mortgage to secure advancements or as an outright
transfer of title for a consideration of $500.00.
This was not an action to change the terms of an inter
vivos trust agreement or of a Will, but simply pertained as
to the upholding or disclaimer of the absolute form of a written
deed for which consideration has been paid.
-14-

This Honorable Court held In Re Beal's Estate, 214 P.2d
525:
The rule of construction, that the intent of the
Testator must be carried out, does not authorize
Courts to make a new Will to conform to what
they think the Testator intended, but the intent
of the Testator must be ascertained from the
Will as it stands.
Appellants cite Sine v. Harper, 222 P.2d 571, which
was heard by this Honorable Court as to the reformation of
a deed, and seeks to use the langauge of this Court as authority
for the testimony of the Attorney for the Settlor, who was
also the scrivener, changing the intent and purpose of the
plain words of the inter vivos trust to what the scrivener
alleges to be the intent of the Settlor.
The action in the Sine case was for the reformation
of a deed on the grounds of mutual mistake and the statements
made by purchasers through their agent was held to be admissible
for purposes of showing beliefs of the purchasers or to establish
the extent of the agent's authority.
It is pointed out to this Court, that the Court restated
its position as held in George v. Fritsch Loan & Trust Company,
69 Ut. 460, 256 P. 400, 403, wherein the Court stated:
The law is well settled in this and in other jurisdictions, that a written contract will be reformed
to express the agreement of the parties when the
proof of the mistake is clear, definite, and convincing,
-15-

and where the party seeking the reformation is
not guilty of negligence in the execution of the
contract nor laches in making timely application
for its reformation.**
It is suggested to this Court that in the instant matter
before it, there is no clear and convincing evidence as to
the intent of the Settlor, other than the clear language of
the Trust Agreement itself, and that the scrivener, as well
as the Co-Trustees, beneficiaries and Appellants, are free
from negligence in the final wording of the inter vivos trust,
in that the testimony of the Settlorfs Counsel, who is also
the scrivener, was to the effect that the Settlor's Counsel
testified he personally dictated the original Trust Agreement
and the Amendment to the Trust Agreement (R-88); that Counsel
for the Settlor did not read the Trust Agreement prior to the
subscription thereto (R-96); and the testimony ^further that
the Settlor's Counsel believed that the three Co-Trustees,
beneficiaries and Appellants, also read the Trust Agreement
prior to the subscription thereto by the Settlor.
The laches would be evidenced by the fact, that the
original Trust Agreement was subscribed to on October 3, 1968,
by the Settlor and the three Co-Trustees, and that an Amendment
was made to the Trust Agreement on November 8, 1971, (R-51,R551, and that no action was taken by the Co-Trustees or the
-16-

Settlor's Counsel for a revision of the Trust Agreement until
v i***

an Answer and Counterclaim was filed by the Co-Trustees on
April 10, 1974. (R-4)
In the Estate of John W. Baum, 4 Ut.2d 375, 294 P.2d
711, this Court held:
Elementary in the law of Wills, is that the intention
of the Testator must govern. To arrive at that
intention, the Courts must consider the Will in
its entirety and not merely the particular clauses
which are in dispute. This Court has recognized
that a Testator has a right to dispose of his
property as he sees fit, and he may disinherit
close relatives if he desires, no particular form
of disinheritance being necessary to accomplish
that objective. All that need appear is that
Testator intentionally excluded the particular
heir.

This Court further held in the cited case, that extrinsic
evidence cannot be resorted to to dispute the Testator's recitals
where the intention of the Testator is manifested.
If this Court deems that it is proper and possible to
reconstruct the intent o f a Settlor, where there is a variation
of such intention as alleged by the Settlor's Counsel in testimony more then seven years following the drafting of the original
Trust Agreement, and where the language of the dispositive
terms of the trust are clear and unequivocal, then it is submitted
to the Court, that there are some interesting aspects of the

•-«*—

intent of the Settlor as were recited by the scrivener justifying
-17-

the special bequest to the Respondent, as well as allowing
Respondent equal participation in the residuary estate.
The scrivener testified that at the time of the making
of the original Trust Agreement of October 3, 1968, (R-53),
that the Settlor stated to the scrivener, that her son, Ned,
had been killed somewhere in 1944 or thereabouts, and that
as a result of the demise of her son, Ned, that the Settlor
received $10,000.00 in insurance as the G.I. beneficiary of
the son (R-92).

The Respondent, Larry R. Rentmeister, is the

only child and heir of the Settlor's son, Ned, and, of course,
was living at the time that the Settlor received her. son's
$10,000.00 G.I. insurance.
It was further testified to by the Settlor's Counsel,
that at the time of the drafting of the 1968 inter vivos trust,
the Settlor did not advise the scrivener of the amount that
she wanted to leave to her grandson, the Respondent herein
(R-83), and that the scrivener further testified:
My notes reflect a dollar sign and blank. Later
she called me and through her own son sent a
note to me telling the total amount to be left
to the grandson (R-83) .
The scrivener further testified that on the telephone,
the Settlor stated that she wanted the blank amount of the
specific bequest to be in the sum of $5,000.00.
-18-

The scrivener further testified that about 1971, the
Settlor telephoned and stated that she wanted to increase the
specific bequest for her grandson and have it changed from
$5,000.00 to $7,000.00. (R-88)
The lack of decisiveness of the Settlor at the time
of the drafting of the inter vivos trust, as has been hereinabove
set forth, together with the setting first of an amount of
$5,000.00 and then an amount of $7,000.00 as a specific bequest
for the Respondent, coupled with the admitted fact that the
Settlor received G.I. insurance in the amount of $10,000.00
or more from her son, Ned, who is the father of the Respondent
herein, all is indicative of an intent, if inferences are to
be made, of what the intent of the Settlor was at the time
of the drafting of the inter vivos trust, and can just as readily
be seen as the desire of a 78-year old mother and grandmother
(R-33), to do justice to her deceased son's only child by returning
to him the monies received as a result of the death of her
son and the G.I. insurance in the amount of $10,000.00, or
more, having declared the Settlor as a beneficiary, instead
of the grandson, who was the only living child of her son,
Ned.
It is submitted to the Court, that if there was any
indecisiveness on the part of the Settlor as to what to leave
-19-

~~~

to her grandson, it was only how much of the insurance proceeds
received by Settlor from her son should be returned to Respondent
and not as to whether or not her deceased son's only living
son, the Respondent, should share equally in the residuary
estate with her other three children.
The Appellants have cited Hurst v. Kravis, 333 P.2d
314, as authority that a trust may be reformed because of a
mistake and clerical error, but it is submitted to the Court,
that this citation is not in point in the instant matter before
the Court, in that reformation was being sought on behalf of
all of the direct beneficiaries of the trust in accordance
with the Statute of the State of Oklahoma, wherein contingent
beneficiaries were also a party brought in as a class, also
in accordance with Oklahoma Statutes for the purpose of clarifying
the investment terms of the trust which in its existing form
did not make possible the carrying out of the intent of the
Settlor.

i

Appellants cite the case of Ford v. Ford, 492 S.W.2d
376, as a citation in support of the position of the Appellants,
that an irrevocable trust may be modified where the Attorney
for the Settlor made a mistake in drafting of the trust.

It

was clearly shown in this case, that the intent was to make
the trust irrevocable for a period of ten years in order that
-20-

special tax benefits would benefit the Settlors, and in constructing
., it, the Attorney set forth that the property was conveyed "absolutely
and irrevocably for a term in excess of ten years, as hereinafter
designated".
The error made was that Section 2 of the trust instrument
provided that the trust would become effective from the 1st
day of Januaryf 1967, and continuing until January 4, 1976,
on which date the beneficiary would be 21 years of age, but
the fact was that the beneficiary became 21 years of age nine
years and four days after the date of the creation of the trust
and was, therefore, in conflict with not only the intent and
the purpose of obtaining tax benefits by establishing the proper
time period in the trust, and the Court allowed a change of
trust based upon error in order that the intent of the Settlor
and the purpose of the trust would be carried out and the conflict
of the period of the trust removed.
The Appellants cite the case of Leitner v. Goldwater,
48 N.Y.2d 614, (App.Br.p.9).

In some manner, this is supposed

to be affirmative of the position of the Appellants and the
attention of the Court is called to the cited part therein
where it states in the case and has been recited by Appellants,
that:
The Court further observed that the failure of
the Settlors to read the modification which they
-21-

signed, because they were busy men who imposed
great confidence in their lawyer, would not of
itself vitiate the right to reformation.
It should be noted by the Court, that the Counsel for
the Settlor has testified that the Settlor did read the Trust
Agreement, as well as the three co-beneficiaries and trustees,
but it was the Attorney who did not read the Trust Agreement
after having dictated it personally, (R-54,-95,-96), and it
is, therefore, submitted that this citation is somewhat the
opposite as to the present factual situation before the Court,
Appellants cite the case of Vogel v. City Bank Fireman's
Trust Company, 272 N.Y.2d 643, as authority by the Supreme
Court of New York County, that a trust deed can be reformed
based upon an error and mistake of the attorney who prepared
the document in failing to include a revocation clause.
Respondent has no argument with the finding of the Court,
but cites glaring distinction in the instant matter before
the Court and in the Vogel facts.
In the Vogel case, supra, the Settlor was the father
of a daughter and created a trust intended to provide for the
daughter and her issue for only so long as such financial protection
was necessary, and asked his attorney to so draft a trust instrument.
The attorney drafted the trust agreement as an irrevocable
trust and subsequently it became unnecessary for the financial
-22-

protection of the daughter and her issue to have the trust
i* inasmuch as from another source, a large trust was created

-oe

for the daughter and her children.
An action was brought for modification of the Trust
Agreement and was brought by the still living Settlor, together
with his wife, and the adult and minor beneficiaries of the
trust, all stating to the Court the purpose of the trust and
testifying as to what the intent was for the drafting of same,
and that it should have been drawn as a revocable trust. The
Court with all parties interested in the Trust Agreement being
in agreement, other than the Bank Trustee, the Court held:
If it appears that the power to revoke should
have been expressed in the instrument, a Court
of equity will now regard as done whatever the
parties really intended, and which in good conscience
should have been done, and thus, the relief will
be adapted to the exigencies of the case.
It is further submitted to the Court, that the additional
case citations by the Appellants, all of which involve the
modification of a deed, which are set forth as citations by
Appellants on pages 9, 10, and 11 of Plaintiff's Brief, (Sheedy
v. Stine, 101 N.Y.2d 773; Delap v. Leonard, 178 N.Y.2d 102;
Mills v. Shulba, 213 P.2d 408; and Sunnybrook Children's Home,
Inc. v. Dahlem, 265 So.2d 921;) are totally distinguishable
from the attempted modification of an inter vivos trust seven
-23-

years following the creation of the trust and following the
demise of the Settlor, by evidence that is not clear and convincing.uu-u ^
Appellants cite the case of First National Bank & Trust
Company of Oklahoma City of Oklahoma v. Foster, 346 F.2d 49,
U.S.C.A. 10th Circ. (1965), on page 8 of Appellants1 Brief,
upholding that the intention of the Settlor should control
if not in conflict with established principles of law and an
action requiring the Co-Trustees to accept an amendment or
supplement to the Trust Agreement they were administering.
It should be noted that in this cited case, the Settlor,
who was the Plaintiff in the cited case, reserved the right
to provide by a supplemental writing the manner of distribution
of the corpus of the irrevocable trust upon the demise of the
Settlor and the challenge made by the trustees and beneficiaries
of the trust was to the right of the Settlor to make more than
one change in the beneficiaries and in the manner of distribution
of the corpus of the trust.

The right of the Settlor was upheld

by the decision in this case and has no relevancy to the instant
matter before the Court.
The Appellants cite Artmar, Inc. v. United States Fire
and Casualty Company, 148 N.W.2d 641, Sup.Ct. of W i s e , as
authority in the instant matter before the Court, even though
the case deals with the negligence of an insurance agent, the
-24-

Court allowed a modification of the insurance contract and
alleged that in insurance cases, that less is required to make
out a cause of action for reformation than ordinary contract
disputes.
In The Matter of the Estate of Eben E. Robinson, Deceased,
280 P.2d 676, Sup.Ct. of Wash., (Mar., 1955), an attempt by
the Executor of the estate to establish by extrinsic evidence
the Testator's intent, and particularly permitting the Attorney
who drew the Will to testify over legatee's objection on the
matter of the Testator's intent.
The Court held that such testimony was in error, the
Court stating:
Appellant contends that the Court erred in permitting the Attorney who drew the Will and a bank
representative, to testify, over Appellant's objection,
concerning the intent of the Testator with reference
to the bequest in question. With this contention,
we agree for the reason that the intent of the
Testator in this respect was ascertainable from
the document itself, without the necessity of
extrinsic evidence.
The Court further stated as the law of the State of
Washington, that the intent of the Testator must be determined
without going outside the four corners of the Will if it is
possible.
In the case of In Re Poppleton's Estate, 34 Ut. 285,
97 P. 138, this Court held that the intention of the Testator
-25-

is to be ascertained from the language used by the Testator
in the Will,, and if the meaning is clear from the words that
are used, that no resort to any construction is necessary nor
permissible, but:
Where, however, meaning of a word or phrase employed
by the Testator is not clear, and may be given
either one of two or more meanings when read in
the light of the whole instrument, the Courts
may not only, but are required to look to the
conditions and circumstances surrounding the Testator
at the time the Will was made and in the light
of these determine his true intention.
This Court set the basic standard of determination of
the intent of a testamentary instrument in the case of In Re
Bealf s Estate, 214 P.2d 525, when it held that the rule of
construction that the intent of the Testator must be carried
out does not authorize the Courts to make a new Will to conform
to what they think the Testator intended, but the intent of
the Testator must be ascertained from the Will as it stands•
This Court's opinion in the Beal case, supra, is similar
to the holding of the District Court of Appeal for California
in the case of In Re Avila's Estate, 192 P.2d 64, wherein the
Court held that the testimony of an attorney who drew the Will
as to what the Testatrix had said to him before the Will was
drafted was inadmissible where the language in the Will presented
no ambiguity calling for any judicial interpretation.
-26-

The

Court further stated:
The purpose of construction as applied to Wills
is unquestionably to arrive, if possible, at
the intention of the Testator; but the intention
to be sought for is not that which existed in
the mind of the Testator, but that which is expressed
in the language of the Will. It is not the business
of the Court to say, in examining the terms of
the Will, what the Testator intended, but what
is the meaning to be given to the language which
he used. Where the terms of the Will are free
from ambiguity, the language used must be interpreted
according to its ordinary meaning and legal import,
and the intention of the Testator ascertained
thereby.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted to this Honorable Court, that the inter
vivos trust before this Court is clear and unequivocal as to
its meaning and import and that there is no latent or patent
ambiguity in the instrument before the Court, and that the
scrivener having drafted a trust instrument, which he dictated
himself, and which was read by the Settlor and by the three
Trustees and beneficiaries, without dissent or complaint during
the lifetime of the Settlor, should not now be allowed to testify
in a manner contrary to the terms of the trust as to the disposition
of the trust estate, and that if in fact there was negligence
in the drafting of the inter vivos trust agreement on the part
of Counsel for the Settlor, that the remedy for the Co-Trustees
-27-

and beneficiaries lies with the negligent party and not in
a modification of the inter vivos trust agreement.
Respectfully submitted,

PETE NT VLAHOSV "^-^
Attorney for Respondent
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
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